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COAST GUARD STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT:
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990S

by

Brian D. Kelley

June 1990

Thesis Advisor:

Roger D. Evered

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) Code 36	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, California 93943-5000			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, California 93943-5000		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
					WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) COAST GUARD STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990S					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Kelley, Brian D.					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Master's Thesis		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1990, June	
				15. PAGE COUNT 98	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	Coast Guard Strategy; Coast Guard Strategic Management; Coast Guard Strategic Management-- Law Enforcement		
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The purpose of this study is to examine how the United States Coast Guard develops and manages its law enforcement mission. The author analyzes the Coast Guard's strategy development in its maritime law enforcement mission. Specifically, the thesis starts with a review of the strategy concept and attempts to answer what strategy is, what a strategist is, and what is strategic planning. Secondly, this study cites four factors (the organizational culture, public opinion, the law enforcement mission role, and expectations) that will significantly influence Coast Guard law enforcement strategy in the 1990s. Finally, the author addresses the current Coast Guard law enforcement strategy from its formulation to its execution.					
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Prof. Roger D. Evered			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (408) 646-2646		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL Code AS/Ev

DD Form 1473, JUN 86

Previous editions are obsolete.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

S/N 0102-LF-014-6603

UNCLASSIFIED

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Coast Guard Strategic Management:
Law Enforcement in the 1990s

by

Brian D. Kelley
Lieutenant, United States Coast Guard
B.S., U.S. Coast Guard Academy, 1982

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT


from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine how the United States Coast Guard develops and manages its law enforcement mission. The author analyzes the Coast Guard's strategy development in its maritime law enforcement mission. Specifically, the thesis starts with a review of the strategy concept and attempts to answer what strategy is, what a strategist is, and what is strategic planning. Secondly, this study cites four factors (the organizational culture, public opinion, the law enforcement mission role, and expectations) that will significantly influence Coast Guard law enforcement strategy in the 1990s. Finally, the author addresses the current Coast Guard law enforcement strategy from its formulation to its execution.



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	1
A.	BACKGROUND -----	1
B.	THE COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSION -----	1
C.	SCOPE OF THE STUDY -----	2
D.	RESEARCH QUESTIONS -----	2
E.	THESIS METHODOLOGY -----	3
II.	THE STRATEGY CONCEPT -----	6
A.	WHAT IS STRATEGY? -----	6
B.	WHAT IS A STRATEGIST? -----	8
C.	WHAT IS STRATEGIC PLANNING? -----	10
III.	FACTORS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY -----	17
A.	THE COAST GUARD'S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE -----	17
B.	PUBLIC OPINION -----	25
C.	THE COAST GUARD'S ROLE IN MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT -----	35
D.	MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPECTATIONS -----	48
IV.	COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY -----	53
A.	AN OVERVIEW -----	53
B.	THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY -----	54
C.	THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY -----	60
D.	THE COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY -----	64
E.	LAW ENFORCEMENT PLANNING AND BUDGETING FOR INTERDICTION -----	70

V.	CONCLUSION -----	74
A.	SUMMARY -----	74
B.	PRIMARY FINDINGS -----	75
C.	SECONDARY FINDINGS -----	79
D.	RECOMMENDATION -----	84
	LIST OF REFERENCES -----	86
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	90

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author thanks the following individuals for providing invaluable assistance throughout the course of this study. I couldn't have accomplished such a task without their guidance, cooperation, and support.

Thanks to my wife, Lori, and our children, Brandy Rose and Sean Patrick, my thesis advisor, Professor R. Evered, and second reader, Commander C. Coy, USCG, Vice Admiral C. Robbins, USCG, Rear Admiral W. Leahy, USCG, Captain L. Eagan, USCG, Captain D. Worth, USCG, Captain N. Saunders, USCG, Captain J. Milbrand, USCG, and family, Captain C. Nicholson, USCG, Captain L. Fairchild, USN, Commander T. Allen, USCG, Lieutenant Commander S. Francis, USCG, Lieutenant Commander C. Bromund, USCG, Lieutenant Commander M. Seglem, USN, Lieutenant Commander D. Kiyohara, USN, Lieutenant F. Reid USCG, and the crew of the USCGC SAPELO, Lieutenant R. Falkey, USCG, Lieutenant G. Breithaupt, USCG, Lieutenant L. Jacobs, USCG, Lieutenant D. Egli, USCG, Lieutenant J. Clarke, RAN, Lieutenant B. Amidon, USN(SC), Lieutenant D. Reese, USCG, Lieutenant M. Edson, USN, and all the other kind people who helped me through this academic exercise.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Throughout the history of the United States, the U.S. Coast Guard has served as the leading agency in maritime interdiction. This role appears to be gaining increased importance as the nation enters the 1990s. In the 1980s the United States' drug abuse problem became increasingly significant to the point where President Reagan declared the problem a national security issue. New developments, such as increased Department of Defense involvement in narcotics interdiction, and a heightened national interest on the nation's drug problem, focus the need for effective Coast Guard strategic management in its law enforcement mission.

B. THE COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSION

Today's Coast Guard missions may be divided into seven major program areas: Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT), Search and Rescue (SAR), Aids to Navigation (ATON), Ice Operations, Marine Environmental Protection, Marine Safety, and Defense Readiness. Thus, the Coast Guard's Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (law enforcement) mission is one of seven major programs for which the service is responsible. The Coast Guard carries out its role of maritime drug interdiction under the authority of its ELT program.

The overall objective of the Enforcement of Laws and Treaties program is to enforce all federal laws in the marine environment, except those specifically assigned to other Coast Guard programs, such as vessel safety and marine pollution. This multidimensional law enforcement program includes the following program objectives:

1. Enforce federal law on the high seas and in U.S. waters.
2. Interdict drug smugglers and illegal migrants.
3. Enforce Exclusive Economic Zone laws and regulations up to 200 nautical miles off U.S. shores.
4. Inspect domestic and foreign fishing vessels to ensure compliance with U.S. laws.
5. Help other agencies enforce U.S. laws.

C. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This thesis examines the development of the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy for the 1990s. Although the Coast Guard maritime law enforcement mission includes other areas of emphasis, the scope of the study will focus primarily on narcotics interdiction.

D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

There is no formally stated long-range Coast Guard law enforcement strategy to date. This study primarily asks "What is the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy and how is that strategy developed?"

To get to the heart of the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy, several other subsidiary questions arise and are addressed in this study. These questions include:

1. What are the weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and strengths underlying strategic management of the USCG law enforcement mission?
2. How is the illegal drug enforcement strategy affected by increased national interest in:
 - a. halting the flow of narcotics into the U.S. versus eradication in the producing nations?
 - b. diverting resources from supply reduction toward reducing demand?
3. How is USCG strategic management in the law enforcement mission affected by increased Department of Defense involvement in narcotics interdiction?
4. What effect does increased Department of Defense involvement in narcotics interdiction have on USCG tactics, resources, and force structure?
5. How does the USCG budget structure reflect its law enforcement strategy?
6. How does the federal budget process (deficit reduction, Congressional oversight, etc.) influence USCG law enforcement strategy?

E. THESIS METHODOLOGY

This study combines a theoretical examination of the strategy concept with the practical application of strategic planning in the Coast Guard law enforcement mission. To do so, the author conducted research that focused on professional readings from both military and civilian strategic management publications as points of contrast and comparison. The practical aspect of Coast Guard law

enforcement strategy and its development emerged as a result of extensive periodical readings and personal or telephone interviews with key Coast Guard and Department of Defense personnel in strategic, planning, programming, budgeting, and operating law enforcement roles.

The purpose in starting with a theoretical approach to answering the Coast Guard law enforcement strategy question is to develop a sound understanding of a concept that is inherently ambiguous. To this end, the author looks at the strategy concept from three perspectives. First, reviewing "What is strategy?" develops some common themes to the varied definitions of strategy. Second, identifying "What is a strategist?" serves to highlight intuition and rationality as desirable traits in the person who strategizes. Third, introducing "What is strategic planning?" exhibits the dynamic nature of the strategy process.

The theoretical and practical strategy issues are linked by focusing on four factors that will significantly influence Coast Guard law enforcement strategy in the 1990s. Specifically, these factors are the Coast Guard's organizational culture, public opinion, the Coast Guard's role in maritime law enforcement, and maritime law enforcement expectations. Each of the factors contributes to the steps in the strategic planning process that directly assist in identifying strategic Coast Guard law enforcement issues. The particular steps of the process are identifying

organizational mandates, assessing the external and internal environments, and clarifying organizational missions and values.

Finally, the author examines the practical development and implementation of Coast Guard law enforcement strategy. The National Drug Control Strategy and the Department of Transportation's Strategies for Action provide "top-down" strategy direction. The Coast Guard "bottom-up" strategy includes the objectives, policies, and action sequences that are embodied in the service's planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation system.

In concluding, the author relates his practical findings to the theoretical strategic planning process. The author answers the primary research question by summarizing the Coast Guard law enforcement strategy and leading the reader through the strategic planning process which results in development of that strategy. The research questions are then reiterated and their answers summarized. Finally, the author closes by recommending that a formal, long-range strategy statement should be issued by the Coast Guard.

II. THE STRATEGY CONCEPT

This section introduces the strategy concept from three separate, yet related, approaches. We begin the process by asking the question, "What is strategy?" Once the recurring theme in the strategy definitions has been determined, the next issue determines "What is a strategist?" We shall determine that the strategist can be visualized as embodying the characteristics of both a leader and a manager. Finally, the strategic planning process is explained by answering "What is strategic planning?" In this focus, strategic planning is described and contrasted with long-range planning. The author then offers Bryson's description of a strategic planning process to model Coast Guard law enforcement strategic management.

A. WHAT IS STRATEGY?

There is no single, universally-accepted definition of strategy. Different concepts of strategy can be combined to form a definition that is unique to a given situation. However, the recurring theme in each strategy definition examined in this research is that strategy is an ongoing, never ending process that is dominated by a sense of purpose regarding the future of an individual or organization.

In his article entitled "So What is Strategy?" Roger Evered examines the three strategy concepts of Andrews (corporate strategy), Liddell-Hart (military strategy), and Michael (futures research strategy). Each of their conceptions of strategy pertains to one of three key aspects of Coast Guard law enforcement (fiscal competition for limited resources, physical interdiction of smuggling activities, and resource allocation among the Coast Guard's multiple missions).

First, Coast Guard strategy in the highly competitive fiscal arena of law enforcement (Evered's corporate strategy field)

...is seen as a process for generating viable directions that lead to satisfactory performance in the market place, given a variety of legal constraints and the existence of competitors. Strategy is characterized as rivalry amongst peers, for prizes in a defined and shared game. [Ref. 1:p. 70]

Second, the service's law enforcement strategy in the area of interdiction (Evered's military strategy field)

...is viewed as the art of winning a protracted struggle against adversaries. Strategy here is seen as an enduring struggle between enemies. Power and control of the other's behavior is the prize. [Ref. 1:p. 70]

Third, Coast Guard strategy regarding the allocation of its multimission resources toward the law enforcement mission (Evered's futures research strategy field) "is viewed as a joint task of appreciating a complex of environmental changes and making core existential choices in situations of massive change." [Ref. 1:p. 70]

Overall, the most powerful description of strategy the author discovered was that articulated by Andrews. He describes strategy as

...the pattern of decisions in a company that determines and reveals its objectives, purposes, or goals, produces the principal policies and plans for achieving those goals, and defines the range of business the company is to pursue, the kind of economic and human organization it is or intends to be, and the nature of the economic and non-economic contribution it intends to make to its shareholders, employees, customers and communities. [Ref. 2:p. 43]

B. WHAT IS A STRATEGIST?

There is a difference between leadership and management, but both concepts contribute to the notion of what a strategist is. Leadership can form and affect culture. Schein writes, "A unique function of 'leadership' as contrasted with 'management' or 'administration,' is the creation and management of culture." [Ref. 3:p. 171] Leadership is intuitive, management is rational. The concept of leadership follows from Burns' description of a transformational leader--one who engages with others in such a way that he and his followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality [Ref. 4:pp. 19-20].

Management relates to Burns' description of a transactional leader--one who takes the initiative in making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things. Mintzberg describes four roles, or organized sets of behavior that make up a manager's job, as seen in Table 1.

Interestingly, Mintzberg cites the function of "leader" within the interpersonal role of the manager. Nonetheless, each of these roles contributes to a manager's capability to strategize [Ref. 5:p. 27].

TABLE 1

THE MANAGER'S ROLES

1. Formal Authority and Status

2. Interpersonal Roles

Figurehead
Leader
Liaison

3. Informational Roles

Monitor
Desseminator
Spokesman

4. Decisional Roles

Entrepreneur
Disturbance Handler
Resource Allocator
Negotiator

A strategist combines the features of both the transformational leader and the transactional leader. Forming and executing strategy requires the intuition of leadership and the rationality of management. The strategist, as leader and manager, then forms the patterns of decisions that integrate an organization's goals, policies, and action sequences [Ref. 6:p. 8].

C. WHAT IS STRATEGIC PLANNING?

Steiner defines formal strategic planning from four points of view:

1. Strategic planning deals with the futurity of current decisions and analyzes the cause and effect consequences over time of an actual or intended decision that a manager is going to make.
2. Strategic planning is a continuing process that begins with the setting of organizational aims, defines strategies and policies to achieve them, and develops detailed plans to ensure that the strategies are implemented to achieve the ends sought.
3. Strategic planning is a philosophy, a thought process, an intellectual exercise, rather than a prescribed set of processes, procedures, structures, or techniques.
4. A formal strategic planning system is a structure that links three major types of plans: strategic plans, medium-range plans, and short-range budgets and operating plans. [Ref. 7:pp. 13-15]

Strategic planning is a management innovation that is likely to persist because, unlike many other recent innovations, it accepts and builds on the nature of political decision making. The strategic planning process can be applied at each level of the Coast Guard's law enforcement chain of command. Each leader and manager needs to exercise as much judgment as possible in the areas under their control. To do so, the Coast Guard leader and manager must develop effective strategies to cope with changed and changing circumstances, and must form a consistent and justifiable basis for decision making. Thus, strategic planning is a set of concepts, procedures, and tools designed

to assist leaders and managers with the aforementioned tasks [Ref. 8:p. xii].

1. Strategic Planning versus Long-Range Planning

Strategic planning and long-range planning are often used synonymously. While there may be little difference in outcome, Bryson notes that they usually differ in four fundamental ways, as seen in Table 2. [Ref. 8:pp. 7-8]

There is no such thing as the strategic planning process which every organization should accept. Strategic planning processes must be designed to fit the unique characteristics of each organization. Planning is not a panacea for the problem of strategy making [Ref. 9:p. 88]. The focus of strategic planning is not the process itself, rather, strategic planning must be a set of concepts that assist leaders to make important decisions and take important actions. If the strategic planning process hinders strategic thinking and acting, scrap the process, not the thinking and acting [Ref. 8:p. 2]. As Steiner notes, strategic planning is not an effort to replace management intuition and judgment [Ref. 7:p. 16].

2. The Strategic Planning Process

Since strategy can be regarded as a process, it is important to determine how strategy is developed. The author chose Bryson's strategic planning process to model Coast Guard law enforcement strategic management because it best represents the key features of an organization operating in

TABLE 2
STRATEGIC VERSUS LONG RANGE PLANNING

<u>Strategic Planning</u>	<u>Long Range Planning</u>
1. FOCUS	
- identifies/resolves issues	- specifies goals and objectives
- does not presume consensus on organizational purposes, actions	- consensus required on goals/objectives/budgets/programs
2. ASSESSMENT	
- greater emphasis on assessing external and internal environment	- assumes current trends will continue into the future
- expects new trends and discontinuities	- less likely to include qualitative shifts in direction
- includes broader range of contingency plans	
3. VISION	
- conjures an idealized version of the organization	- forecasts linear extrapolation of the present
- includes "vision of success" and how it may be achieved	- embodied in goal statements representing projections of existing trends
4. ACTION	
- more action oriented	- assumes a <u>most likely</u> future
- considers a range of possible futures	- works backward to map out decisions/actions necessary to reach assumed future
- focuses on implications of present decisions/actions	- tends to lock into a single stream of decisions/actions
- considers multiple decision streams	

the public sector. Bryson's strategic planning process includes three notable approaches that particularly apply to the overall characteristics of the Coast Guard and its environment. These approaches, namely, the Harvard Policy model (Andrews, 1980; Christensen et al., 1983), the Stakeholder Management approach (Freeman, 1984), and the Logical Incrementalism approach (Quinn, 1980; Lindblom, 1959), and their key features, assumptions, strengths, and weaknesses are presented in Table 3. [Ref. 8:pp. 24-28]

TABLE 3

APPROACHES TO STRATEGIC PLANNING

Harvard Policy Model

Key Features: Primarily applicable at the strategic business unit level. WOTS Analysis. Analysis of management's values and social obligations of the firm. Attempts to develop the best "fit" between a firm and its environment; i.e., best strategy for the firm.

Assumptions: Analysis of WOTSs, management values, and social obligations of firm will facilitate identification of the best strategy. Agreement is possible within the top management team responsible for strategy formulation and implementation. Team has the ability to implement its decisions. Implementation of the best strategy will result in improved firm performance.

Strengths: Systematic assessment of strengths and weaknesses of firm and opportunities and threats facing firm. Attention to management values and social obligations of the firm. Systematic attention to the "fit" between the firm and its environment. Can be used in conjunction with other approaches.

Weaknesses: Does not offer specific advice on how to develop strategies. Fails to consider many existing or potential stakeholder groups.

Stakeholder Management Approach

Key Features: Identification of key stakeholders and the criteria they use to judge an organization's performance. Development of strategies to deal with each stakeholder.

Assumptions: An organization's survival and prosperity depend on the extent to which it satisfies its key stakeholders. An organization's strategy will be successful only if it meets the needs of key stakeholders.

Strengths: Recognition that many claims, both complementary and competing, are placed on an organization. Stakeholder analysis (i.e., a listing of key stakeholders and of the criteria they use to judge an organization's performance.) Can be used in conjunction with other approaches.

Weaknesses: Absence of criteria with which to judge different claims. Need for more advice on how to develop strategies to deal with divergent stakeholder claims.

Logical Incrementalism Approach

Key Features: Emphasizes the importance of small changes as part of developing and implementing organizational strategies. Fuses strategy formulation and implementation.

Assumptions: Strategy is a loosely linked group of decisions that are handled incrementally. Decentralized decision making is both politically expedient and necessary. Small, decentralized decisions can help identify and fulfill organizational purposes.

Strengths: Ability to handle complexity and change. Attention to both formal and informal processes. Political realism. Emphasis on both minor and major decisions. Can be used in conjunction with other approaches.

Weaknesses: No guarantee that the loosely linked, incremental decisions will add up to fulfillment of overall organizational purposes.

The following strategic planning process suggested by Bryson attempts to help key decision makers think and act strategically. The process includes setting broad policy directions, assessing the internal and external environments, attending key stakeholders, identifying key issues, developing strategies to deal with each issue, making decisions, acting, and continually monitoring results. Bryson's strategic planning process consists of eight steps, as follows:

1. Initiating and agreeing on a strategic planning process.
2. Identifying organizational mandates.
3. Clarifying organizational missions and values.
4. Assessing the external environment: opportunities and threats.
5. Assessing the internal environment: strengths and weaknesses.
6. Identifying the strategy issues facing an organization.
7. Formulating strategies to manage the issues.
8. Establishing an effective organizational vision for the future--the "vision of success."

The interactions of the strategic planning process are diagrammed in Figure 1. Bryson's strategic planning process is introduced here to emphasize that strategic planning is a dynamic process that involves many different forces, trends, stakeholders, resources, performances, and strategies.




Figure 1. Strategic Planning Process

Bryson's process closely matches the Coast Guard's approach to strategy development. Bryson's strategic planning process and its relation to Coast Guard law enforcement strategic planning will be summarized in the concluding chapter.

Before doing so, however, the succeeding chapter focuses on connecting the strategy concept to Coast Guard law enforcement strategy. This will be accomplished by focusing on how the external and internal environments affect the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy.

III. FACTORS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY

It is not the author's intention to identify every factor that affects Coast Guard law enforcement strategy. However, the purpose of identifying culture, public opinion, the Coast Guard law enforcement role, and expectations is to highlight their significant effect on the Coast Guard's internal and external environments and the resulting development of the service's law enforcement strategy in the 1990s.

A. THE COAST GUARD'S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Studying the Coast Guard's culture will show how the organization solved its basic problems of surviving in and adapting to the external environment, and how it integrates its internal processes to ensure the capacity to continue to survive and adapt. [Ref. 3:p. 50]

1. An Overview

The Coast Guard's organizational culture is closely linked to its small size in relation to the other armed services. Until recently, the nation's oldest seagoing service has maintained a low profile in the media, the political arena, and the community. Occasionally, a major event will occur that showcases the Coast Guard--Caribbean narcotics and immigrant interdiction operations, the Coast Guard base on Governors Island, New York, hosting the Liberty

Week 1986 festivities and the Presidential summit meeting in 1988, or the Valdez, Alaska tanker oil spill--but, for the most part, the service has lacked the prestige in society commensurate with the jobs it performs.

Schein writes that, "Individual and organizational performance, and the feelings that people in an organization have about that organization, cannot be understood unless one takes into account the organization's culture." [Ref. 3:p. 24] To understand the Coast Guard and its people, we must analyze its organizational culture.

2. The Founding Father

The Coast Guard's roots date back to the establishment of the United States Revenue Cutter Service, which was initiated by Congress on August 4, 1790. The Service was to act as the maritime strong arm of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton as he attempted to enforce American tariffs. Working on an extremely tight budget, Hamilton had ten new cutters constructed, and thus the Coast Guard as we know it today got underway. [Ref. 10:pp. 32-34]

Hamilton's plan was to keep a solitary cutter stationed near each of the nation's major ports from Maine to Georgia. This spread the assets of the Revenue Cutter Service along the eastern seaboard much in the same way that the Coast Guard's assets are now found in small coastal inlets as well as in the major ports. Just as Hamilton wanted the Revenue Cutter Service to cover as much of the

coast as possible, the same concern holds for the Coast Guard today.

This illustrates three examples of how the individual intentions of the founder of a new organization, his definition of the situation, his assumptions and values, "come to be a shared, consensually validated set of definitions that are passed on to new members as 'the correct way to define a situation.'" [Ref. 3:p. 50] The Revenue Cutter Service operated on a tight budget, had a large area to cover, and had to perform a difficult task with limited assets. The notions of "Small Service, Big Job," and "Doing More With Less,"¹ are undercurrents of the attitudes that exist in the Coast Guard today.

The Coast Guard's cultural formation process started with its founder, Alexander Hamilton, who had, as Schein states, "a major impact on how the group defines and solves its external adaptation and internal integration problems." [Ref. 3:p. 210] The Coast Guard exists as a result of an evolutionary process. As the years passed following the establishment of the Revenue Cutter Service, other organizations, such as the Lifesaving Service (1912) and the Lighthouse Service (1939) were combined with the Revenue Cutter Service to form the modern Coast Guard. Other duties were also added to the Coast Guard's missions, such as

¹Actual USCG bumper sticker slogans.

international ice patrol after the 1912 sinking of the Titanic. The service was also charged with enforcing whatever maritime interdiction that the government required. For example, the Coast Guard was tasked with halting the maritime flow of contraband during the Prohibition period, just as today it patrols our coasts to prevent narcotics smuggling.

The Coast Guard has expanded and contracted its size to meet wartime obligations, however, its resources (personnel, platforms, operating expenses) were seldom increased to match each additional mission it assumed. There lies the fundamental highlight of the organizational culture, the Coast Guard motto, *Semper Paratus*. The Coast Guard's philosophy is that it's "always ready" to take on a mission. However, the service itself is continually forced to do more with less.

Now that the culture has matured through the long and rich Coast Guard history, the culture creates the perceptions, thoughts, and feelings of every new generation in the organization. This makes the organization predisposed to certain kinds of leadership. [Ref. 3:p. 313]

3. The Coast Guard's Cultural Leader

The organizational culture has developed a Coast Guard leader who is a "go-getter," who can do "more with less." What the culture hasn't fostered is someone who is proactive rather than reactive, who is exciting rather than

excitable. The service's culture has lead to a "firehouse mentality" that waits for something to happen--like awaiting the Search and Rescue alarm to sound--before springing into action. These characteristics of a Coast Guard leader also result from the process--also part of the culture--where the service is directed to do a job (such as stopping the massive inflow of Cuban refugees in the early 1980s), so it goes out and does it with whatever resources are available.

The Coast Guard's culture affects its policy and the image the service projects. There is no "once and for all" policy, and this is the result of short-term reactions to the political setting [Ref. 11, p. 272]. As always, the Coast Guard gets the job done, but its methods are sometimes subject to question. For example, the reactive part of Coast Guard culture--cutting out non-emergency Search and Rescue to cut costs--served to undermine the traditional aspect of Coast Guard culture--assisting vessels in distress.

4. The Coast Guard's Changing Culture

To specify the function culture serves, we must list, from an evolutionary perspective, the issues that an organization faces from its origin through to its state of maturity and decline. Now it seems that the organizational culture which has developed while the Coast Guard matured may be changing. Until the 1980s, the Coast Guard's basic problem was limited funding. The Coast Guard's reaction to

this problem was to "grin and bear it," and still accomplish its missions.

In 1989, Coast Guard Commandant Paul Yost stated that, "I can't run ships without fuel, and I'm not going to run units I can't afford to maintain." [Ref. 12:p. 22] Non-emergency Search and Rescue is handled by commercial towing, and aids to navigation maintenance is being contracted in lieu of acquiring the assets to do so. The Congress is slowly realizing that maritime interdiction is not cost effective in reducing the nation's drug problems [Ref. 13], therefore, the budgetary relief the Coast Guard receives to augment its forces to combat smuggling may be in jeopardy. The Coast Guard has stretched itself as thinly as it can, no longer will it continue to do "more with less." It's obvious that the culture of yesterday won't solve the problems faced today. Thus, the culture is under stress and may have to change. Just as Alexander Hamilton directed the formation of the Coast Guard's culture when the Revenue Cutter Service was founded, Coast Guard strategy makers are challenged with incorporating the changes that are taking place in the Coast Guard's culture today. Coast Guard strategy must mesh with what the Coast Guard has to offer in fulfilling the national interest.

5. Changing Culture Affects Strategy

Bryson links the concepts of philosophy, culture, and image in a "service hexagon" as a way of determining what

service strategies an organization should pursue, as seen in Figure 2. The service hexagon centers on the notion that for a product or service to be effective (to pass a "market test"), six elements must be linked: who wants the product or service (the target market), what they want (the specific product or service), where they want it (location), when they want it (delivery timing), how they want it (delivery method, technologies used), and why they want it (fulfilled functions, purposes served, reasons for use).




Figure 2. The Service Hexagon

When one of the internal characteristics of an organization changes, a strategy change can be anticipated [Ref. 8:p. 264]. To illustrate Bryson's service hexagon, consider that the Coast Guard's Semper Paratus philosophy remains intact. Now assume that, as previously discussed, the service's culture is changing. This cultural change also affects the Coast Guard's image. As the service displays more emphasis toward its law enforcement mission, the Coast Guard image of "the Lifesavers" changes to that of the "Smokeys of the Sea." Instead of just one characteristic changing, the service is experiencing a dual change. The changing culture and image leads to strategy changes as the Coast Guard addresses the issue of providing law enforcement "service." The final outcome results when all these changes combine to affect the law enforcement mission strategy.

As long as it has the power to do the job, which the author equates with adequate resources, the Coast Guard will continue to survive. Increased competition for fiscal resources will force the Coast Guard to market itself in the political arena and in the public sector. The changing Coast Guard culture, specifically regarding obtaining adequate resources to accomplish a mission, creates a need to change the service's fiscal strategy. Thus, as Bryson would suggest using his service hexagon, a change in the Coast Guard culture brings about a change in its strategy. The changed strategy is evidenced by Commandant Yost's increased emphasis

on--and success in--selling or marketing the service's capabilities to Congress [Ref. 14:pp. 10-11].

The Coast Guard's role in serving the national interest will expand as long as it receives enough resources to perform its missions. The service has an abundance of exceptional performance to focus on as proof that it serves the nation, and that it's in the nation's interest to have a strong Coast Guard.

B. PUBLIC OPINION

This section focuses on the impact of public opinion on the development of strategy. Public opinion affects Coast Guard law enforcement strategy development through its heavy influence on policy.

Strategy development is closely linked to an organization's capacity to attain goals. This goal-achieving ability is inherently tied to the organization's resource base. In times when competition for scarce fiscal resources is especially intense, Congress tends to respond to the demands of its constituents, and the Administration remains closely tuned to public concerns. Thus, the Coast Guard must consider the impact of public opinion when it develops its law enforcement strategy.

1. An Overview

General Social Surveys were first generated by the General Opinion Research Center in the 1930s; each year since

then measures of public opinion have become increasingly significant to policy makers. Public opinion affects strategy through its effects on an organization's goals and, particularly, policies. The most recognizable measure of public opinion is the opinion poll, which attempts to gain insight about public sentiment from a representative sample of the population being measured. As Philip Converse notes, "Public opinion is what the polls try to measure, or what they measure with modest error." [Ref. 15:p. S14]

2. The Variability of Public Opinion

The most striking characteristic of public opinion over the years is its variability over time. There are distinct trends in the opinion of the public as a whole which reflect the public's narrow focus and immediate reactions to emerging situations. [Ref. 16:p. 62]

The variability of public opinion is principally a function of six factors:

1. Individual personality characteristics.
2. Ideology, an individual's way of viewing the world.
3. Past generational experience.
4. An individual's acceptance of authority, willingness to follow leaders and social conventions.
5. Economic self-interests.
6. Alternative choices. [Ref. 17:p. 83]

3. Types of Public Opinion

Fundamentally important before analyzing, evaluating, or acting on a response to public opinion is that a policy maker consider how important an issue is to an individual in relation to other issues [Ref. 18:p. 75]. Sometimes a divergence occurs between "populist" public opinion as measured by surveys, and the "atmospheric" public opinion that is the actual public opinion effective in the political arena [Ref. 15:p. 19]. An example of the difference between populist and atmospheric public opinion measures can be found in the gun control issue. The populist opinion measured by pollsters is that most Americans favor gun control. However, no steps are effectively taken by the public toward influencing political leaders to enact gun control, thus atmospheric public opinion appears to be indifferent toward the gun control issue.

If populist public opinion doesn't always result in action, what conditions affect the impact of public opinion on policy? As stated, Americans respond to perceptions of world events. Public opinion toward policies of the American government can be described as "permissive" in that a wide range of government activity is acceptable to the public. This contrasts with "directive" opinions, which specify that certain alternatives are definitely demanded or opposed [Ref. 19:p. 98]. For example, individual thoughts concerning drug control spending are characterized as permissive opinion

because various actions (interdiction, treatment, education) are supported by the public. A person's view on the abortion issue can be considered as a directive opinion since the decision to legalize abortion is generally classified as either yes or no.

4. Influencing Public Opinion

Studies have shown that public opinion is significantly affected by highly publicized crises (such as the Americans held hostage in Iran or the current national drug abuse crisis), and the public's level of understanding the issue (usually characterized as low) [Ref. 16:p. 71]. Three fundamental groups with vested interests in policy making actively influence public opinion. First, media coverage of incidents tend to bring crises into the American living room. The particular increase in television documentation that tends to gear toward sensational issues places public opinion at the mercy of graphic displays of events as they occur. Second, rhetoric from our political leadership takes the form of carefully packaged issues with simple, attractive slogans meant to persuade the public toward accepting political actions proposed by the government. Third, interest groups actively campaign toward influencing both public opinion and the way that governmental policy reflects the perceived national interest.

Significant groups can be persuaded for short periods of time in response to an issue before opinion reverts to the

status quo. It's during these short bursts of activity surrounding an event or crisis that policy makers are affected by the pressures of public opinion and interest groups. For example, a symbiotic relationship between interest groups and Congress has developed to use and influence public opinion. Congress finds the information provided by interest groups, and the penchant of interest groups to sort out issues and set priorities for the Congressional agenda, forceful in overcoming legislative inertia. Members of Congress look to interest groups for valuable constituency, technical, or political information, for reelection support, and for strategic assistance in passing or blocking selected legislation. Interest groups, on the other hand, rely on Congress as an institution where their representative position of public opinion can be heard in an attempt to achieve policy goals. [Ref. 20:p. 224]

The key concept is the transfer of information. Public opinion is formed by the perceptions generated in the information transfer process. Biases are introduced into the information flow. The media, policy makers, and interest groups influence the public through the manner in which their information is conveyed and interpreted. Distortions are created by manipulation; data can be used to create false images, and that leads to a badly informed public. James L. Payne highlights the exaggerations and distortions about defense spending put forth by critics of the defense

establishment and the nation's defense policy. Specifically, on the policy issue of American military preparedness, the facts presented to the American public are often misreported in "astounding dimensions." [Ref. 21:p. 61]

Forming a policy, budgeting for that policy, and then executing the policy involves a dynamic process with several principal players or factors. Each of the players is affected by the actions of other players in the process. In the arena of national drug control, our nation's political leaders, the policy makers, must persuade or convince the other players of the need for continued drug control spending to attain our highest political aim: to make drugs undesirable and hard to get through a mix of supply and demand policies [Ref. 22:p. 43].

5. Perceptions Affect Public Opinion

The public's perception of the world affects their opinion on America's national drug control policy. Public perception often centers on the balance of strength between the United States and its adversaries. Public opinion concerning the world balance of military power was evidenced in the presidential elections of 1960, when a perceived missile gap tied to the Eisenhower administration weighed against Vice President Nixon, and again in 1980 when a sense of weak national security policy damaged the campaign rhetoric of incumbent President Carter [Ref. 23:p. 155] Both the Kennedy and Reagan administrations subsequently sparked a

resurgence of confidence in American military power and its weaponry. Mandates for increased policy emphasis on defense are represented in the 1980 public opinion shift toward greater willingness to spend on defense than on any other kind of spending [Ref. 24:p. 385]. Three trends are cited in the public's support of President Reagan's execution of an increased national security and defense posture: 1) the decline in impact of the Viet Nam war; 2) a rise in elements of conservative ideology; and 3) an increase in anti-Soviet and anticommunist sentiment [Ref. 21:p. 103].

Currently, the significant reduction in the perceived fear of a communist threat has caused policy makers to reevaluate their strategies and reformulate policies regarding national security and defense. Resources previously allocated toward countering the communist threat now may be available to focus on the drug control issue. Thus, public opinion sends signals to policy makers concerning what policy should be formulated. The level of commitment toward a policy is reflected in public approval of budgeted spending levels, and the final evaluation of policy execution often comes on election day.

6. Public Opinion's Affect on Policy

What of the relationship between public opinion measures and policy formulation and execution? Does public opinion change cause policy change, or vice versa? The importance of public opinion to policy makers is evident when

you consider the new vocation of campaign consultant which has emerged in the last three decades with roots in the special expertise of how to conduct public opinion polls and how to read their results. The significance of a public opinion analyst reached its apogee during the Reagan administration when daily White House opinion polls were conducted. Policy makers often pay large sums of money for public opinion polling information, often not to change policy, but to know what issues to avoid and which to emphasize. [Ref. 15:pp. 17-22]

Analysis of the relationship between public opinion and policy making in the last 50 years by Page and Shapiro shows a great deal of congruence between changes in policy and changes in public opinion. While none of the quantitative studies measuring the degree of congruence between popular opinion and policy outcomes of the political process show perfect congruence, most show a considerable degree of it [Ref. 25:pp. 177-189]. Specifically, large congruence is noted when opinion changes are large and sustained and issues are salient. Congruence, however, does not indicate causality. Page and Shapiro argue that public opinion is a real influence--often an intervening one--on policy making in more than half of the cases of congruent change, while they are unsure how often policy change causes congruence between opinion and policy. Thus, opinion changes are an important cause of policy change. When a third factor

affects both opinion and policy, it tends to affect policy through opinion; policy changes because opinion changes [Ref. 25:p. 177-189].

Budgeting is affected by public opinion because it is inherently linked to policy. As Wildavsky states, "budgeting is concerned with translating financial resources into human purposes," and a budget is "a link between financial resources and human behavior in order to accomplish policy objectives...a series of goals with price tags attached." [Ref. 26:p. 2] Thus, budgeting lies at the center of the political process, and budgets are affected by public opinion through opinion's influence on policy making.

For example, the American public has been of two minds regarding the United States' national security and defense policy; it demands leadership that vigorously pursues arms control and reduction, and it also wants a policy that provides for a strong defense [Ref. 23:p. 150]. This duality stimulates flexible policy and budgeting choices. As long as no defense weakness is perceived, arms reduction is acceptable. Likewise, the American public will not accept being held at a military disadvantage. President Reagan and Defense Secretary Weinberger took advantage of permissive public opinion when they continued to favor larger defense budgets in the mid-1980s despite lacking the full support of the American public [Ref. 27:p. 44].

7. Public Opinion and Drug Control Policy

What can be concluded about the relationship between public opinion and national drug control policy? First, public opinion and policy are closely related when considering congruent changes over time. Second, public opinion is one of several factors that influence policy making. The policy making process evidences a dynamic interaction of many players (policy makers, the public, interest groups, the media) and factors (current events, past history, future expectations). Third, public opinion is affected by the perceptions of individuals, and can be significantly affected by highly publicized crises on salient issues for short periods of time before returning to the status quo. Finally, information plays a key role in developing individual perceptions. Information is often provided to the public by players with policy issues needing public support. Thus, information is sometimes tainted, or deceptive, and biased toward swinging public opinion toward a particular issue.

Policy changes taking place today in the areas of drug control, national security, and defense spending can be seen to result from significant swings in public opinion. The public no longer perceives a threat from the communist world and battle lines are being drawn by policy makers on whether to alter the course of the nation's defense based upon short-term public perceptions. The threat to national

security from illegal drugs remains. However, the method of countering this threat combines a mixture of supply and demand reduction policies. There is a good deal of flexibility in these permissive areas of public opinion. Therefore, it appears that drastic policy changes in drug control strategy will not necessarily result from the current state of affairs.

C. THE COAST GUARD'S ROLE IN MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT

The Coast Guard's role in maritime law enforcement is a perception that significantly affects the service's strategy development. As long as the United States has had a need for maritime law enforcement, it has had a need for the Coast Guard.

1. An Overview

The Coast Guard perceives its role in the law enforcement mission as that of the nation's leading maritime interdiction agency. The Coast Guard develops its law enforcement strategy to incorporate two concepts. First, the service's image as the "Smokeys of the Sea" affects the Coast Guard law enforcement strategy, as shown previously in Figure 2. Second, the acknowledgement that the Department of Defense, particularly the Department of the Navy, will continue to become more involved in maritime interdiction efforts leads Coast Guard law enforcement strategists to consider joint operations in the counternarcotics effort.

2. The Traditional Maritime Law Enforcement Mission

Traditionally, maritime law enforcement has been the preserve of the Coast Guard. The history of the Coast Guard role in maritime interdiction is almost as old as that of the United States. The Coast Guard's roots date back to the birth of our fledgling nation's Revenue Cutter Service, which was established by Congress on August 4, 1790. The service was to act as the maritime strong arm of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton as he attempted to enforce American tariffs. [Ref. 10:pp. 32-34]

The missions of the Coast Guard in the 1990s are a far cry from those of the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790. Today's Coast Guard missions may be divided into seven major program areas: Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT), Search and Rescue (SAR), Aids to Navigation (ATON), Ice Operations, Marine Environmental Protection, Marine Safety, and Defense Readiness. It is under the auspices of the ELT program that the Coast Guard carries out its role of maritime drug interdiction.

3. The Navy's Role in Maritime Law Enforcement

The Department of Defense has been involved in drug interdiction since 1971 [Ref. 13:p. 50]. However, it was not until the 1980s that the Navy participated in any significant drug interdiction actions, primarily because it did not have authority to act on the high seas in a law enforcement capacity. The Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) adopted by

Congress shortly after the Civil War specifically makes the distinction between military and police powers. "Military personnel were subject to legal restrictions that prevented the services from becoming primary interdiction agencies."

[Ref. 13:p. 43] In 1981, an amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act allowed the Department of Defense to legally support civilian drug enforcement agencies in their drug interdiction activities. The amendment authorized the military to furnish information, equipment, facilities, training, and advice to law enforcement agencies. Still without arrest authority, U.S. Naval vessels participating in any drug interdiction operations were thus augmented with U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLETs: consisting of four to six Coast Guard personnel) who had the authority to conduct the drug interdiction search and seizure missions. Unlike the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, a part of the Department of Transportation, is exempt from the Posse Comitatus Act.

The embarking of Coast Guard TACLETs in effect extended the number of surface platforms and range of Coast Guard drug interdiction operations. The Navy crew would track and intercept a suspicious vessel and then let the Coast Guard TACLET disembark to search and, if warranted, seize the vessel and its cargo, and arrest its crew. During the interdiction operation the Navy vessel would shift its tactical control to the appropriate Coast Guard area

commander, even to the extent of flying a Coast Guard ensign from its mast during the boarding operation. Each Navy ship with an embarked TACLET had essentially obtained the same jurisdictional capability and responsibility of a Coast Guard Cutter.

4. Problems Experienced with the Navy's Involvement in Drug Interdiction

The impact and results of the Navy's participation in drug interdiction in the 1980s have been limited. For example, a 1983 drug smuggling vessel identification program conducted by the Navy in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard resulted in the seizure of only three drug smuggling vessels. The Navy's reluctance in assuming additional roles and missions, limitations and inflexibility due to traditional mission requirements, and poor coordination by drug and law enforcement agencies, have all contributed to the Navy's diluted efforts in assisting to impede drug trafficking.

a. Reluctance in Assuming Additional Roles and Missions

Navy surface ship and squadron commanding officers were often reluctant to vigorously take on drug interdiction operations, due largely to competing operational training and mission requirements. The numerous training and operational demands already placed upon commanding officers (e.g., Refresher Training and Fleet Exercises) were only compounded with the additional burden of drug interdiction

operations. Rewards and recognition for training and operational readiness and excellence did not include drug smuggling operations. Without full support by higher echelons, commanding officers did not have the incentive nor could they afford to spend additional resources on drug interdiction activities. Drug interdiction was non-traditional. "Senior military leadership were traditionalists....You've got to drag them kicking and screaming into any mission that has to do with anything other than closing and destroying the enemy." [Ref. 28:p. 12]

b. Limitations and Inflexibility Due to Other Mission Requirements

The Navy's role in drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico had also been limited because very few ships routinely operated in these areas. During fiscal year 1988, the Navy's strong resource commitment and mission emphasis in the Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea regions redirected potential assets away from drug smuggling operations and routes, and thus did not significantly augment the maritime interdiction operations. Despite having the TACLET assets on board, the missions of these Navy vessels were not primarily tasked to conduct drug interdiction. TACLETs embarked on Navy ships simply because it was opportunistic, that is, a Navy vessel might be transiting a known drug smuggling route or some intelligence gathered by the Coast Guard indicated the ship might overtake

a drug carrying vessel. Consequently, in many instances there was no specific commitment to drug interdiction, and it was, at best, a secondary mission for most units [Ref. 29]. In the early years during the initial implementation of the TACLETs, the Navy did not dedicate many sailing days strictly for drug operations.

The Navy's flexibility in the use of their ships was very restrictive. Despite planning conferences with the Coast Guard and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS), Navy vessels were not routinely training and operating near drug smuggling routes.

The ships could divert from their naval duties for only a limited distance or time. Consequently, the Coast Guard did not judge it useful to use many of these steaming days to place a Coast Guard officer (TACLET team) aboard a Navy vessel. [Ref. 13:p. 55]

Dedicated Caribbean and Pacific interdiction came as a follow-on to "pulses" of naval activity destined to transit suspected areas of high narcotics trafficking. These pulses were generally training or "showing the flag" missions with stringent transit time restrictions. As a result, many interdiction opportunities fell secondary to the primary mission of making prompt port calls.

Naval aircraft, particularly the E-2C, had significant opportunity for a role in the interdiction of air smuggling activities. However, the aircraft were constantly in demand in naval operations throughout the rest of the world, making it increasingly difficult to participate in

drug interdiction operations. The transfer of four E-2s to the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs Service, and an E-2 wing structural problem made the availability of additional Navy E-2 assets even more scarce.

c. Lack of Coordination

There was initially little coordination between any of the federal, state and local law enforcement agencies involved in enforcing drug laws, particularly in dealing with the Department of Defense for assistance and use of DoD assets. Drug enforcement efforts were decentralized and fragmented, and intelligence gathered was scant and rarely shared among agencies. There was often waste and inefficiency due to the division of responsibilities and inter-agency competition for recognition and budget dollars. [Ref. 30:pp. 85-91]

The purpose of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS), announced by President Reagan in March of 1983, was in part to coordinate drug interdiction efforts between these agencies and the military. In the early stages, unfortunately, "this failed to strengthen the government's hand as much as it might have, because law enforcement officers' limited knowledge of Department of Defense procedures prevented them from using the military resources effectively." [Ref. 31:pp. 95-96] The dedication of Navy surface ships, P-3 patrol planes, and E-2 and S-3

surveillance aircraft had limited success because agencies did not make full or effective use of these assets.

5. Recent Trends in Joint Narcotics Interdiction

In 1988 Congress designated the Department of Defense as the lead agency to detect and monitor both maritime and air drug smuggling into the United States [Ref. 32:p. 112]. With this Congressional action, the DOD was given the added responsibility of coordinating federal drug interdiction detection and monitoring activities. This mandated drug interdiction policy has prompted the Secretary of Defense to review numerous proposals for the military's actual involvement and possible expansion in drug interdiction efforts.

In the interim, the Navy has proposed keeping an aircraft carrier battle group or an amphibious task force off the Columbian borders in the Caribbean Sea throughout 1990. It is also envisioned that additional ships and aircraft could be sent near Columbia to conduct monthly training missions which are currently conducted in the Atlantic off the coast of Florida. [Ref. 29]

Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) and Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic (COMNAVSURFLANT) support of the drug interdiction mission has improved dramatically with the creation of CINCLANTFLT's new Joint Task Force 4 (Key West, Florida), to coordinate the joint narcotics interdiction effort on the east and gulf coasts.

In addition, the recent implementation of a joint Coast Guard and Navy Caribbean squadron has significantly increased the naval presence in drug interdiction operations and constituted the largest joint Coast Guard-Navy operation since World War II. [Ref. 33:p. 101]

Joint Task Force Five (Alameda, California) plays the key role of coordinating the detection and monitoring phases of interdiction on the west coast. The intelligence queueing function served by the Joint Task Force is fundamentally important to every agency that conducts counternarcotics operations. [Ref. 34]

Consequently, Coast Guard and Navy interoperability has improved. Today, joint Coast Guard and Navy drug operations include

...a force make-up for a typical operation normally including a Belknap (CG-26) class cruiser, Coontz (DDG-40) class destroyer, or Spruance (DD-963) class destroyer as flagship; several frigates (FFG/FF); high or medium endurance cutters (WHEC/WMEC); and an oiler. Amphibious and support ships (LKA/LPD/LST), patrol hydrofoils, and Coast Guard sea-based patrol boats also have augmented the force. Squadron fixed wing assets include Navy P-3 and Coast Guard C-130 surveillance aircraft, and embarked helicopters. [Ref. 33:p. 103]

a. Incorporating Multiple Missions into Single Operations

Clearly, the Navy has begun to gear up to the task of narcotics interdiction, as CAPT J. W Lockwood, USCG, former Caribbean Squadron Commander notes:

The Navy's continuing support, with almost 100 of the Second Fleet's ships that have sailed on squadron operations, have made the marimberos more than wary. They

must now consider every gray ship that looms on the horizon to be a threat, whether or not the ship is actually engaged in law enforcement operations and has a (TACLET) embarked. As more and more ships sail with the squadron--some repeatedly, like the McCloy (FF-1038), leading all Navy units with six seizures--their officers and crews become 'drug smart,' and report suspect vessels and possible drug-related activity, even while executing other Navy tasking. [Ref. 33:p. 104]

Joint narcotics interdiction can logistically succeed through use of the traditional multimission philosophy, which incorporates multiple missions into single operations. Thus, Navy and Coast Guard military readiness operations can be used to support the interdiction effort. Joint narcotics interdiction as a part of the multimission philosophy provides the following to each of the participating services:

1. Assists defining realistic roles for the defense readiness mission--joint narcotics interdiction is a tangible addition to improved readiness from military operations.
2. Increased assistance for narcotics smuggling detection and interdiction--as each new participant becomes more familiar and involved, more detection and--ultimately--narcotics interdiction will result.
3. Potentially more efficient use of funds in readiness and operational areas--in the face of future budget austerity, and during times when narcotics interdiction enjoys high visibility and is a Congressional priority, multimission accomplishment that includes drug interdiction, will serve as a more efficient use of resources.
4. Opportunity to develop and use hybrid tactics for use in military and interdiction operations--fighting the drug war in which the law breakers use similar tactics to small insurgent forces, yet who rarely shoot back, offers an opportunity to fight a bona fide enemy with low risks.

5. Operational experience in geographic areas of vital interest to U.S security--expanding joint operations, normally conducted in the North Atlantic or off the Florida coast, to Caribbean waters will familiarize the forces with an area fast-becoming a zone of strategic importance. [Ref. 35:pp. 20-21]

- b. Coast Guard Reaction to Department of Defense Involvement in Joint Interdiction Operations

Congress has occasionally augmented the Coast Guard's Operating Expenses and/or Acquisition, Construction and Improvements (AC&I) with DoD resources. This has been in the form of direct transfers of funds to Coast Guard appropriations, establishment of a special account that the Coast Guard can draw from for specific purposes (the Coastal Defense Augmentation Account--CDAA), the provision of "services-in-kind" using DoD personnel, and time and supplies valued at specific dollar amounts. In FY-1989, the establishment of a separate appropriation, funded from DoD's Military Construction (MILCON, account, augmented Coast Guard Shore Facility projects. Specifically, from FY-1983 to FY-1989, over \$1.3 billion of DoD budgetary resources have been provided to the Coast Guard (\$519.0 million to Operating Expenses and \$850.3 million to AC&I). [Ref. 36]

The Coast Guard benefits from DoD funds targeted toward boosting efforts in the ELT and Defense Readiness program areas. The service has been able to maintain an increased ELT posture by using the resources provided by the DoD. Focusing on the Navy's contribution to Coast Guard ELT efforts, the Coast Guard enjoys several benefits from DoD

involvement in the interdiction arena. When a Coast Guard TACLET rides a USN vessel on a transit through Caribbean waters, it frees a Coast Guard surface unit from a dedicated patrol in the same area. The cost is minimized for the Coast Guard because the cost for a Coast Guard Cutter in the area is replaced by the cost of embarking the TACLET on the USN vessel. The Naval vessel offers a typically broader, more effective monitoring and detection capability to enhance the interdiction effort, and the Navy's cost is limited to the opportunity cost of the time spent conducting an actual interdiction boarding operation with a suspect vessel. The benefits to the Coast Guard of increased use of DoD resources, decreased demand on Coast Guard resources, and more effective surveillance capability appear to outweigh the difficulties of the administrative and logistic coordination effort between the services.

c. Joint Interdiction and USN Outlays

As discussed earlier, the Navy, until recently, has not considered law enforcement as one of its primary missions. Consequently, although it is the much larger service, the Navy has spent less on drug interdiction than the Coast Guard (Tables 4 and 5).

Within the last year the Navy has placed increased emphasis in this area, primarily due to Congressional mandate and the Navy's new willingness to accept drug interdiction as a peacetime mission. This year Congress has

TABLE 4
COAST GUARD ELT FUNDING PROFILE
(\$ in millions)

	<u>FY-1987</u>	<u>FY-1988</u>	<u>FY-1989</u>
Funding for ELT	\$ 825.0	805.9	945.7
Total USCG Funding	\$2,239.9	2,175.2	2,576.5
ELT % of Total USCG Funding	36.7	37.0	36.7

Source: USCG Budget in Brief - Fiscal Year 1990

TABLE 5
DON DRUG INTERDICTION OUTLAYS
(\$ in millions)

	<u>FY-1987</u>	<u>FY-1988</u>	<u>FY-1989</u>
A/C Subtotal	\$11.12	9.58	11.15
Surface Asset Subtotal	\$26.30	24.00	19.00
Total Interdiction Outlays	\$37.42	33.58	30.15
Total DON Outlays (\$billion)	\$90.81	91.70	95.18
Interdiction % of Total	0.041	0.037	0.032

Source: OPNAV 642 Washington, DC

earmarked \$450 million of the DOD's budget for "the war on drugs." [Ref. 37:p. 8]

Despite the huge increase in law enforcement spending by the Navy, the Coast Guard also intends to increase its spending on narcotics interdiction, with the ELT percentage of total Coast Guard funding decreasing only slightly. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence available does not provide a sufficient database to more accurately assess the Navy's contribution toward narcotics interdiction. Table 5 contains information only from FY-1987 to FY-1989 because the Navy figures available prior to then are of

questionable accuracy [Ref. 38]. The decrease in outlays (both in terms of absolute dollars and common size analysis) for drug interdiction during those years is primarily due to the diversion of resources to the Persian Gulf.

D. MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPECTATIONS

The strategic planning process of an organization rests on the fulfilling of its basic socioeconomic responsibilities [Ref. 7:p. 128]. This illustrates why the Coast Guard considers environmental forces--both within and outside the service--in a more than offhand manner.

The analysis of expectations incorporates steps two through five of Bryson's strategic planning process, which considers Mandates, Missions/Values, the External Environment, and the Internal Environment [Ref. 8:p. 48]. Further, the expectations of stakeholders in the law enforcement mission area contribute to identifying the strategic issues facing the Coast Guard. Thus, external and internal expectations significantly affect the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy development.

1. An Overview

The law enforcement strategy process is affected by expectations concerning the future environment in which the Coast Guard will operate. In the ELT mission area, Coast Guard strategy is based upon not only its own expectations,

but those from within the DoD organization as well as anticipations from outside the USCG/DoD community.

2. Expectations Outside the USCG/DoD Community

The United States has achieved a heightened consciousness concerning its drug problem. Recent opinion polls indicate that the nation's drug problem is one of the most important issues facing this country [Ref. 39:p. 34]. In the eyes of many in Congress, international drug smuggling has become a national security issue. In 1986, President Reagan declared a "war" on drugs and claimed that drug smuggling was a threat to national security. There has been considerable debate as to what should be the United States Navy's role in drug interdiction. Proponents in favor of increasing the Navy's part in interdiction operations contest that the service is ideally suited to combat drug trafficking in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific Ocean regions. The Navy has the necessary resources, manpower and equipment, and could simultaneously obtain practical training opportunities without sacrificing military readiness. Conversely, opponents to the Navy's role in drug interdiction challenge that drug trafficking is a law enforcement issue and not a military mission.

Drug enforcement is an unconventional war which the military is ill-equipped to fight; that a drug enforcement mission detracts from readiness; that it is unwise public policy to require the U.S. military to operate against U.S. citizens; and that the use of the military may have serious political and diplomatic repercussions overseas." [Ref. 13:p. v]

Despite the hypothesis that a dollar spent on reducing the demand for drugs is more effective than a dollar spent toward interdicting the supply of drugs [Ref. 13: Appendix I], the National Drug Control Strategy ("to make drugs undesirable and hard to get through a mix of supply and demand policies" [Ref. 32:p. 6]) still provides significant emphasis on interdiction. Our nation's interdiction efforts will be highlighted by an enhanced and expanded role for the DoD in detecting and monitoring drug trafficking. Additionally, the national strategy calls for increased integration and coordination of air, land, and maritime interdiction efforts. [Ref. 32:p. 64]

3. Expectations Within the DoD Community

In 1989, Defense Secretary Cheney directed commanders of DoD's unified and specified commands to come up with plans to interdict the flow of drugs into their particular areas of responsibility. On March 9, 1990, the DoD announced a new plan to boost current interdiction efforts. Under this plan, the Pentagon will deploy additional ships and aircraft in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. The Atlantic Command will continue to use four to five Navy ships with embarked Coast Guard TACLETS and will significantly increase E-3 AWACs flights into the Caribbean. Dedicated anti-drug ship days in the Pacific will increase 146 percent over 1989 figures, and DoD aircraft will fly in excess of 2600 dedicated counter-narcotics hours in the Pacific, a 24 percent increase. The

Pentagon plans to spend \$1.2 billion on anti-drug operations in FY-1991. This year DoD is spending \$450 million on drug interdiction, and in FY-1989 it spent \$300 million. [Ref. 40:p. 10] These are indicators that the DoD has more seriously accepted narcotics interdiction as a mission.

DoN resource representatives aren't so quick to leap onto the interdiction bandwagon. Navy programmers state that their service has an increased responsibility to prove itself in a leaner defense scenario, and that the Navy will use reimbursable DoD "interdiction dollars"--interdiction funds placed in a centrally-managed DoD account and provided to DoD resources as reimbursement for interdiction efforts funded "out-of-pocket"--as a source of funding when tasked with interdiction operations [Ref. 41]. The Navy is hesitant to enter the interdiction arena because it doesn't want to commit itself to funding the interdiction operations strictly out of its own pocket. In essence, it would rather not budget for and commit its resources toward interdiction operations [Ref. 42]. The Navy will be able to use the multimission philosophy noted earlier to combine its operational missions with interdiction, and thus could use the DoD interdiction funds to help finance some of its non-counternarcotics operations [Ref. 43].

4. Expectations Within the Coast Guard Community

In 1986, when current Commandant Paul Yost took office, he mandated a shift in mission emphasis for the Coast

Guard. He dramatically altered the Coast Guard's mission mix and its public image, and he made drug interdiction and military readiness his top priorities. In 1984, SAR was considered the service's primary mission, although its funding amounted to 24.5 percent of total USCG Operating Expenses compared to 27.3 percent for ELT. [Ref. 14:pp. 10-11] In 1990, the trend toward law enforcement emphasis is evident in the growing spread between the ELT and SAR missions--34.7 percent of total OE for ELT, 21.9 percent for SAR (Table 6).

TABLE 6

USCG OPERATING EXPENSES
(in Millions of \$)

Program	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
ELT	460.8	531.7	584.7	618.7	628.2	722.4	776.9
SAR	415.0	385.9	319.5	408.8	423.4	468.2	491.1
ATON	370.3	362.7	371.7	409.5	406.6	452.9	465.2
Other	444.4	473.3	472.0	470.3	450.9	478.9	509.0
Total	1,690.5	1,753.6	1,747.9	1,907.3	1,909.1	2,122.4	2,242.2

(Source: USCG Budget in Brief FY-1990)

Common Size Analysis

Program	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
ELT	27.3%	30.3	33.5	32.4	32.9	34.1	34.7
SAR	24.5	22.0	18.3	21.4	22.2	22.1	21.9
ATON	21.9	20.7	21.2	21.5	21.3	21.3	20.7
Other	26.3	27.0	27.0	24.7	23.6	22.5	22.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

IV. COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY

A. AN OVERVIEW

The Coast Guard formal law enforcement strategy consists of three essential elements: goals (or objectives) to be achieved, the most significant policies guiding or limiting action, and the major action sequences (or programs) that are to accomplish the defined goals within the limits set. [Ref. 6:pp. 7-8]

The realized law enforcement strategy results from a pattern in a stream of actions, as seen in Figure 3. The intended strategy, or what is designed, is exhibited by the National Drug Control Strategy, the Department of Transportation strategy, and the Coast Guard Commandant's agenda. The deliberate strategies, where intentions existed and were then realized, differ from emergent strategies, where patterns developed in the absence of intentions, which went unrealized [Ref. 44:p. 15]. These emergent strategies often result from the impact of public opinion and the budgeting process.

The emphasis here is that the Coast Guard's realized law enforcement strategy is formed partly in response to the strategy intentions of the National and Department of Transportation strategies. However, the significant development of the service's law enforcement strategy results from the




Figure 3. Forms of Strategy

impacts of the strategy designs of the Coast Guard Commandant's agenda and the emergent strategies formed in reacting to public opinion and the budget process.

B. THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

In January of 1990, the White House issued its National Drug Control Strategy. Basically, the national strategy is

...designed to erode the power and spread of drugs by consistently keeping pressure on all the avenues through which illegal drugs are made available or desirable and, further, to hold those who use drugs accountable for their actions. [Ref. 32:p. 2]

1. An Overview

The fundamental principal of the national strategy is to make drugs undesirable and hard to obtain through a mix of supply and demand policies [Ref. 32:p. 6]. The National Drug Control Strategy's supply reduction policies serve as guidance for Coast Guard law enforcement strategy development.

There are three modes of the supply side of narcotics smuggling. First is the in-country mode, which spans from drug production to conveyance out of the producing country. Second is the transportation mode during which the narcotics are smuggled via air, air-to-surface, or surface routes to the consuming nation. The third supply side mode, the investigative mode, exists from the moment the narcotics enter the consumer country until the drugs are in the hands of the consumer. [Ref. 45] Coast Guard interdiction occurs during the transportation mode of the narcotics supply side, as depicted in Figure 4.

The Coast Guard is a participant in the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program (OCDETF). As shown in Figure 5, the OCDETF consists of nine federal agencies as well as state and local law enforcement offices. The purpose of OCDETF is to "coordinate investigation and prosecution of highly sophisticated and diversified criminal drug related and money laundering enterprises." [Ref. 32:p. 16] Each participant in the OCDETF forms a strategy to fulfill the




Figure 4. Narcotics Supply Side Transportation Mode

purpose of the program. These individual strategies are affected by the approaches of the other participants. This highlights the dynamic process at the national level that emphasizes the importance of strategy integration and congruence among the participants.

2. Coast Guard Specific Initiatives

The National Drug Control Strategy highlights several initiatives which particularly involve Coast Guard participation. First, the national strategy emphasizes interagency intelligence collecting, collating, and disseminating. Intelligence provides the key toward learning




Figure 5. OCDETF Agencies

about the character of criminal organizations, their structures, activities, bases of operations, and movements of individual members. [Ref. 32:p. 17]

Second, the national strategy focuses on international initiatives as part of its supply reduction policy. The cornerstone of the international drug control strategy is to work with and motivate other countries to engage their own resources and efforts to defeat the drug trade. The Department of State is specifically tasked to coordinate U.S. agency assistance to other countries [Ref. 32:pp. 49-52]. Frequently the Coast Guard is tasked with

providing such assistance for several reasons, among them are:

1. Using the Coast Guard doesn't appear as politically or militarily offensive as using DoD resources. The white-hulled Coast Guard Cutters typically offer a "non-defense" assistance avenue of entry that gray hulls don't have. [Ref. 46]
2. The Coast Guard, as part of the nation's counternarcotics force, fulfills the national strategy of enhancing relations with central American nations.
3. Coast Guardsmen are recognized as riverine specialists, which make them ideally suited for in-country operations. The service and its missions closely match those missions of the smaller nation's naval force. [Ref. 47]

Third, the national strategy emphasizes interdiction efforts whose goal is to deter drug smuggling by intercepting and seizing illegal drug shipments entering the U.S., thereby consistently disrupting narcotics trafficking operations.

Four interdiction highlights of the national strategy have an effect on the development of Coast Guard law enforcement strategy. These are:

1. Enhanced and expanded role for the Department of Defense in the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking.
2. Improved coordination of air, land, and maritime interdiction efforts to deter and interrupt drug smuggling and illegal shipments of drug-related money, munitions, and precursor chemicals as they enter or leave the country.
3. Improved automated data processing equipment for use by the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.
4. Completion of the Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) systems, and their integration with

the Department of Defense Joint Task Forces. [Ref. 32:p. 64]

The Coast Guard participates in both air and maritime narcotics interdiction. The national strategy addresses both efforts.

a. Air Interdiction

The principal goal of the air interdiction effort is to deter general aviation aircraft pilots from transporting illegal drugs toward or into the United States. A secondary goal is to prevent them from delivering their cargo. [Ref. 32:p. 66]

There are three methods of air interdiction which support the national strategy, and the Coast Guard contributes to each mode. First, detection will be augmented by land- and sea-based aerostats which will provide radar coverage of selected areas. Second, improved intelligence support will assist the air target sorting process. Third, physical interdiction of smuggling flights with aircraft resources provides the final step toward achieving the air interdiction goals. [Ref. 32:p. 67]

b. Maritime Interdiction

The goal of the maritime interdiction strategy is to deter drug smugglers, deny seaborne smuggling routes, and detect and seize drug-smuggling vessels and arrest their crews [Ref. 32:p. 68]. The maritime interdiction strategy employs four means of achieving its goal.

First, interdiction forces can focus on predictable geographic choke points to target suspect vessels. Second, instead of relying on inefficient and ineffective random patrols in vast bodies of water, the maritime interdiction effort will rely heavily on intelligence reports to target specific smuggling vessels. Third, increased cooperative efforts with drug source and transit countries will augment the collection of source country intelligence. Fourth, the Administration will also, through the Department of State, seek additional agreements with foreign countries to build on the successful Coast Guard Shiprider program. This program will serve as a tangible link between the United States and other countries in their efforts toward maritime interdiction.

Thus, a set of goals, policies, and action sequences exists at the national level to constitute a drug control strategy. This national strategy serves in part to influence the direction Coast Guard strategy makers take when developing the service's law enforcement strategy.

C. THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY

The Department of Transportation supports the national drug control strategy by including the issue in its strategies for action. The national transportation policy endorses Coast Guard involvement in the counternarcotics effort. Therefore, the National Transportation Policy,

combined with the National Drug Control Strategy, serves as guidance for Coast Guard strategy makers in developing a law enforcement strategy.

1. An Overview

As noted earlier, the Coast Guard operates within the Department of Transportation (DoT) during peacetime. The mission of the DoT, as set forth in the legislation establishing the department is, in part, to "achieve transportation objectives considering the needs of the public, users, carriers, industry, labor, and national defense." [Ref. 48:p. 1] During peacetime and wartime, the nation's civilian transportation system and the Coast Guard are vital to supporting national defense.

The next step down from the President in the Coast Guard's chain of command is the Secretary of the DoT. A second source of guidance from the national level to the Coast Guard's development of its law enforcement strategy comes from the DoT agenda. In its "Strategies for Action," the DoT sets directions for national transportation policy, which are captured under six major themes, one of them being to "Ensure that the transportation system supports the public safety and national security." [Ref. 48:p. vii]

Regarding this concern about supporting national security, the DoT acknowledges that the flow of drugs into this country is a major security issue. Recognizing that drug-related crimes have become a focus of concern across the

United States, the DoT supports efforts to track and intercept drug shipments moving into the country and through the transportation system. [Ref. 48:p. 32]

2. The Coast Guard Role in the Department of Transportation Drug Control Strategy

The United States provides a major world market for the drug trade, and it is a top priority in the President's strategy to halt the import of illegal drugs into this country. Transportation is involved in moving drugs across U.S. borders and within the states. Just as the National Drug Control Strategy highlights several initiatives which involve Coast Guard participation, the DoT strategy includes the service as its major contributor to the antidrug effort.

The Coast Guard plays a centrally important role in the DoT's counternarcotics endeavor. This is indicated by the amount of resources dedicated to the Coast Guard from the DoT's share of national drug control funding. As seen in Table 7, the Coast Guard received over 98 percent of DoT's antidrug funding in FY 1989. This endowment is projected to exceed 95 percent in FY 1990 and 94 percent in FY 1991.

As stated in the DoT's strategy, it is federal transportation policy to: (1) Maintain Coast Guard surveillance on and over the waters to interdict illicit drugs coming from other countries to U.S. shores; and (2) Assist in reducing illegal drug traffic moving on the nation's transportation system, including the maritime system. [Ref. 48:p. 94]

TABLE 7

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET SUMMARY
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
(Budget Authority in millions of dollars)

	<u>FY 89 (act)</u>	<u>FY 90 (est)</u>	<u>FY 91 (req)</u>
USCG	633.5	675.0	731.5
FAA	7.5	22.4	31.4
NHTSA	2.0	6.1	9.7
Total	643.0	703.5	772.6

The national transportation policy sets forth both a long-term strategic planning perspective and a short-term program agenda that addresses the DoT role in the nation's counternarcotics effort. The DoT's strategic focus for the future will be to ensure that the transportation system can perform its basic function efficiently and safely through efforts to: (1) Remain flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances; and (2) Provide the means and incentives for funds and other resources to be targeted to projects and programs that offer the greatest benefits in the nation's transportation system. [Ref. 48:p. 126]

Finally, the DoT offers a general short-term program agenda that endorses Coast Guard participation in reducing the import of illegal drugs into the country. To accomplish this, the short-term program agenda focuses on two directives. First, to maintain Coast Guard surveillance on and over the waters and continue Federal Aviation

Administration support to law enforcement agencies to interdict illicit drugs. Second, to work closely with the Office of National Drug Control Policy and other agencies to reduce illegal drug traffic moving on the nation's transportation system. [Ref. 48:p. 124]

D. THE COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY

1. An Overview

Coast Guard law enforcement strategy deals with deployments over wide spaces, long times and large movements, and before contact with the "enemy." Tactics relate to the actions on the battlefield itself [Ref. 1:p. 63]. Quinn notes that the primary difference between strategies and tactics lies in the scale of action or the perspective of the leader [Ref. 6:p. 3]. The Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy can be viewed as supporting the Grand Strategy (the National Drug Control Strategy), which employs all the resources of the nation to achieve policy objectives [Ref. 1:p. 63].

The Coast Guard develops its law enforcement strategy based upon the significant factors discussed earlier. These factors are embodied in the "Grand" National Drug Control Strategy (expectations outside the Coast Guard community, the Coast Guard role in law enforcement, public opinion), the Commandant's agenda (expectations within the Coast Guard community, the Coast Guard role in law enforcement, the Coast

Guard's culture), and public opinion (which includes the budget).

2. The Coast Guard Law Enforcement Mission

The Coast Guard law enforcement mission consists of more than narcotics interdiction. Among the duties the service performs to enforce federal laws on the high seas and in U.S. waters are interdicting drug smugglers and illegal migrants, enforcing Exclusive Economic Zone laws and regulations up to 200 miles off the nation's shores, inspecting domestic and foreign fishing vessels, and assisting other agencies to enforce U.S. laws. [Ref. 49:p. 17]

Enforcement of Laws and Treaties (ELT) is the largest of the Coast Guard's seven mission areas in terms of budgeted funding. Recalling Table 6, in FY 1990 over 34 percent of Coast Guard operating expenses are budgeted toward the ELT mission. Today, the Coast Guard's counternarcotics effort has arguably made ELT the service's most visible mission.

3. A "WOTS UP" Analysis of Coast Guard Law Enforcement

The strategies which result from a strategic planning process focus on achieving the best "fit" between an organization and its environment [Ref. 8:p. 56]. One method used to identify strategic issues is called the "WOTS UP" analysis. WOTS UP is an acronym for Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats, and Strengths underlying planning [Ref. 7:pp. 19-20].

Through the exercise of research for this study, including several personal and telephone interviews with Coast Guard personnel, the author has identified some of the WOTS regarding the Coast Guard's ELT mission. This WOTS UP analysis is subject to debate and disagreement, as Steiner notes, "Agreement is made more difficult by the fact that managers at different levels inevitably come to different conclusions...." [Ref. 7:p. 146]

The results of this WOTS UP analysis are summarized in Tables 8 through 11.

TABLE 8

USCG ELT MISSION WEAKNESSES SUMMARY

1. No formally stated long range strategy.
2. CG's multimission capability requirement inhibits intensive, specialized training for ELT, which affects strategy development.
3. No good measure of effectiveness.
4. Unsure if the changing marginal value of interdiction is greater than the increasing marginal value of resources employed.
5. No clear definition of interdiction - departure zone (more effective at stopping drug flow) versus arrival zone (more arrest/seizure numbers.)
6. Strategy reacts to threat assessment and other agency actions, is not proactive.
7. Personnel identity crisis - "Lifesavers" versus "Smokeys of the Sea."
8. Unable to quickly respond to the threat with budget dollars.
9. High tech force structure won't be necessary if ELT emphasis shifts from counternarcotics.
10. Not enough emphasis on feedback to refine operational techniques.
11. Weak integration (particularly communications) among interdiction participants.
12. Tendency to focus on short term (what we're doing) rather than long term emphasis (where we're going.)
13. Assets are easily surveilled by enemy.
14. Rules of engagement force predictability of response to threats.
15. Increased DoD involvement adds another layer to law enforcement bureaucracy.

TABLE 9

USCG ELT MISSION OPPORTUNITIES SUMMARY

1. Heightened antidrug sentiment--more funding.
2. Redevelop infrastructure with increased funding.
3. An overall stronger service resulting from synergy associated with multiple mission capabilities.
4. Give up certain ELT responsibilities.
5. Shift resources to other missions as DoD assumes a greater counternarcotics role.
6. Work closely with DoD, using their resources and USCG authority.
7. More involvement in the international arena.

TABLE 10

USCG ELT MISSION THREATS SUMMARY

1. Competition for resources:
 - a. for drug control funding (DoD/USCS/DEA/FBI)
 - b. for DoT funding (AMTRAK/FAA/NHTSA).
2. Increased Congressional oversight slows fiscal process and generates unwieldy requirements.
3. DoD support of the USCG budget may diminish or disappear.
4. Interest groups sway public opinion and affect strategy designs.
5. "False Threat" is DoD assuming ELT mission - USCG has other ELT missions emphasis, DoD has no statutory authority, DoD doesn't establish detection and monitoring requirements.
6. Decreased funding as public opinion shifts away from its anti-drug emphasis toward other interests (such as environmental protection.)
7. Decreased funding as national drug control shifts away from supply reduction toward demand abatement.

TABLE 11

USCG ELT MISSION STRENGTHS SUMMARY

1. Public opinion--approval of the Coast Guard image.
2. Increased skill at marketing the service's capabilities.
3. Multimission capabilities.
4. Synergy from multiple mission capabilities.
5. "Other" responsibilities within ELT mission--Fisheries, Safety, Migrant Interdiction, Foreign Security Training.
6. Aggressive in seeking out new missions and funding.
7. Resilient personnel with mission enthusiasm.
8. Increased capacity to process intelligence.
9. Quick operational response capability.

This WOTS UP analysis indicates two strategic issues whose themes recur throughout the list of characteristics.

First, the Coast Guard must be sensitive to the present and future needs of the public and mandates from the Administration (concerning missions and policies) and Congress (regarding the budget). In doing so, the Coast Guard follows an agenda set by its Commandant. Second, the service must strive to maintain its multimission capability and corresponding force structure. The multimission capability and force structure enhance the Coast Guard's capacity to respond to emerging situations and trends.

4. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Strategy Development

The Coast Guard law enforcement strategy addresses the strategic issues identified by the ELT mission WOTS UP analysis. The service has developed an informal, decentralized law enforcement strategy that essentially performs two functions. First, the strategy follows the directives dictated by the National Drug Control Strategy and the DoT Strategies for Action. Secondly, the strategy maintains a service-wide mission and resource flexibility that places emphasis on coordinating the efforts of a multitude of interdiction assets to respond to emergent political, economic, and military situations. This supports what Quinn describes as

...the essence of strategy...is to build a posture that is so strong (and potentially flexible) in selective ways that the organization can achieve its goals despite the unforeseeable ways external forces may interact when the time comes. [Ref. 6:p. 8]

The decentralized strategy development process runs headlong into the requirement for coordination [Ref. 50:p. 319]. This need for coordination emphasizes the importance of the Coast Guard Commandant's agenda. His strategy functions to provide coherence to organizational action [Ref. 51:p. 52].

Allison cites that government consists of a conglomerate of semifeudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own [Ref. 50:p. 317]. The Coast Guard is one of those government organizations that attends to a special set of problems and acts in quasi-independence on these problems. Allison further notes that, "Government leaders can substantially disturb, but not substantially control, the behavior of these organizations." [Ref. 50:p. 317] For example, in 1988 Coast Guard Commandant Paul Yost mounted his own successful campaign with Congress to restore \$60 million of a \$103 million shortfall--without the outward support of the Administration [Ref. 52:p. 2]. This highlights the importance of the Commandant's agenda and actions in Coast Guard law enforcement strategy development.

The Coast Guard's ELT strategy is evident in the efforts of its Commandant to rejuvenate the service's force structure. Admiral Yost focuses on the image of the Coast Guard as an integral part of defending our national security interests in the war on drugs. Thus, strategy development moves from a definition used by General U.S. Grant in the

1860s, "Strategy is the deployment of one's resources in a manner which is most likely to defeat the enemy," to the strategy of seeking and maintaining a sustainable advantage. Von Clausewitz stated that strategy is maneuvering for competitive advantage toward a desired goal [Ref. 53:p. 165], which implies flexibility, an on-going process, understanding goals, and internal and external competition [Ref. 54].

Importantly, in the public eye and in the opinion of Congress, the Coast Guard is now considered a viable defense force with a multimission capability [Ref. 55:p. 12]. Admiral Yost has packaged a new product, and it's selling well in Congress based upon appropriation response.

F. LAW ENFORCEMENT PLANNING AND BUDGETING FOR INTERDICTION

1. An Overview

The primary document in the Coast Guard planning process is the Commandant's Long Range View. In it the Commandant sets forth his view of the environment in which the Coast Guard will be operating over the next 25 years. For example, the current Long Range View forecasts sustained involvement in deterring drug trafficking and use in the maritime region [Ref. 56:p. 16]. These projections combine with formally-stated objectives (such as "to enforce federal laws and international agreements on and under the waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and on and

under the high seas where authorized." [Ref. 57:p. 1-2]) to provide specific policy guidance for Coast Guard planners.

In October 1965, President Johnson directed the introduction of a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) approach for the entire Executive Branch. The Coast Guard was among the first of the non-DoD agencies to comply. The basic PPBS approach has proven to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the changes time has brought and is used Coast Guard-wide. [Ref. 57:p. 1-1]

2. The Coast Guard Law Enforcement Budget

The Coast Guard's budget serves as the integrating method to translate its strategic plans into current actions. The budget sets standards for coordinated action and provides a basis for controlling performance to see that it is in conformance with strategic planning [Ref. 7:pp. 215-218]. Performance measures are difficult to enumerate in the ELT mission. "Body counts," or measures of interdiction effectiveness (arrests made, kilos of cocaine seized, convictions gained, etc.), don't provide a complete or valid assessment of how well the Coast Guard is doing in its ELT mission [Ref. 58]. However, Congress appears content to use such figures as a yardstick of future federal funding when the narcotics funding pie is cut each year. Citing Wildavsky again, the Coast Guard budget is "a link between financial resources and human behavior in accomplishing policy objectives." [Ref. 26:p. 2]

There is often a tendency for budgeting to drive out strategic thought and action. The Coast Guard's ability to carry out its strategy is closely linked to its resources, and the strength of Coast Guard resources is tied to the budgeting process. It is increasingly difficult to implement a long-term strategy when the strategy is intimately tied to a short-term budgeting process. The Coast Guard's effort to develop and execute a strategy, like other agencies in the federal government, is hampered by a shortsighted budget process. [Ref. 47]

3. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Strategic Path Programs

The Coast Guard will continue to use its high profile law enforcement mission as a springboard toward funding new programs. Since the 1986 anti-drug legislation was passed, the Coast Guard has successfully accomplished a major force structure overhaul that encompassed the following acquisitions:

1. Sophisticated HU-25C Falcon interceptors modified with F-16 radar.
2. Navy E-2C Hawkeye radar planes for long range surveillance.
3. HH-3F Pelican helicopters being replaced by HH-60J Jayhawks.
4. Outfit C-130s with E-2C radar.
5. Operate land-based aerostat radar system.
6. Procure 110-foot patrol boat fleet. [Ref. 14:p. 13]

The need to make sure that strategic thinking precedes, rather than follows, budgeting is most important. Through its version of PPBS, the Coast Guard has budgets and budgeting procedures in place to capitalize on strategic planning and strategic plans [Ref. 8:p. 181]. The FY-1991 Coast Guard budget request includes the following:

1. \$2.391 billion for Operating Expenses (a 6 percent increase).
2. \$419.5 million for AC&I to pay for fleet renovation and modernization of High Endurance cutters, renovation of Medium Endurance cutters, motorboat replacement program, HH-60J helicopter procurement.
3. \$23 million for Research and Development.
4. \$78.9 million for Reserve Training. [Ref. 55:p. 12]

Thus, the Coast Guard's strategy is evident in its budget. The budget reflects: (1) the need to update its force structure, and (2) a continued commitment toward its ELT mission in response to public opinion and in support of the National Drug Control Strategy. The question remains whether the state of the art equipment now dedicated to the high technology counternarcotics effort is needed or efficient should the service shift its future emphasis to other missions.

V. CONCLUSION

The key points highlighted by the thesis are summarized along with the principal findings regarding the research questions posed in the introduction. Finally, the author closes with a recommendation that the Coast Guard should formally state its long-range law enforcement strategy.

A. SUMMARY

This study traced the development of the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy. Starting from a theoretical discussion of the concept of strategy, the author answered the questions "What is strategy?", "What is a strategist?" and "What is strategic planning?" The central notion developed is that there is no single, universal definition of strategy. However, recurring themes occur in each strategy definition, specifically, that strategy is a never-ending process that is dominated by a sense of purpose regarding the future of an individual or organization.

The Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy will be significantly affected by four factors throughout the 1990s. These factors are the Coast Guard's organizational culture, public opinion, the service's perceived role in maritime law enforcement, and maritime law enforcement expectations.

This paper introduced maritime law enforcement as a mission served traditionally by the Coast Guard and recently by the Department of Defense. The Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy, although decentralized and informal, is a guide for its planning and budgeting processes. The strategy emphasizes maintaining a multimission capability to respond to the needs of the public and mandates of the Administration and Congress. The Commandant's agenda is a key factor in developing and acting on the service's strategy.

Finally, the Coast Guard has used its enhanced image in the public sector as a marketing tool to boost Congressional support of its programs, particularly those which deal directly with the ELT mission. In this sense, Congressional backing comes in the form of funding, which is being used to augment and update the Coast Guard's force structure.

This thesis set out to address particular research questions. The following sections reiterate those questions and provide a summary of the response to those questions based upon the author's research findings.

B. PRIMARY FINDINGS

The Coast Guard's law enforcement mission is to enforce all federal laws in the marine environment, except those specifically assigned to other Coast Guard programs. The multidimensional law enforcement program includes

interdicting drug smugglers and illegal migrants, enforcing Exclusive Economic Zone laws and regulations, inspecting fishing vessels for compliance with U.S. laws, and assisting other agencies to enforce U.S. laws. This study focused primarily on the counternarcotics objective of Coast Guard law enforcement.

1. What is the Coast Guard Law Enforcement Strategy....

There is no formally stated long-range Coast Guard law enforcement strategy to date. To identify the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy, we must define the pattern of purposes, policies, programs, actions, decisions, or resource allocations that define what the organization is, what it does, and why it does it [Ref. 8:p. 59].

The Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy consists of supporting the National Drug Control Strategy and the Department of Transportation's Strategies for Action ("to make drugs undesirable and hard to obtain through a mix of supply and demand policies"), and doing so by following the agenda set by the service's Commandant. The agenda includes maintaining a service-wide mission and resource flexibility that places emphasis on coordinating the efforts of a multitude of interdiction assets to respond to emergent political, economic, and military situations.

2. ...and How is that Strategy Developed?

The Coast Guard law enforcement strategy develops in a manner that closely follows the strategic planning process

suggested by Bryson (Figure 1). This method includes four steps which assist in distinguishing strategic issues. First, the Coast Guard identifies organizational mandates (the "musts" it confronts) by paying close attention to the relevant legislation, agreements, and directives that affect its law enforcement operations.

Second, the service clarifies its organizational missions and values to provide its "reason for existence." The Coast Guard does this by seeking to fill the nation's identifiable social and political needs. In this case, the service answers the social and political demand for narcotics interdiction as well as the demands for the other aspects of its law enforcement mission.

Third, the Coast Guard assesses the external environment by continually exploring for the opportunities and threats to its law enforcement mission. This step involves staying in tune to the forces, trends, competitors, collaborators, and clients that make up the external environment. This step emphasizes the significance of public opinion, the Coast Guard's role in law enforcement, and the expectations of individuals and organizations outside the service.

In the fourth step toward identifying strategic law enforcement issues, the Coast Guard assesses its internal environment. The service analyzes its current strategy and performance, which is often indicated by the parameters in

its Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The Coast Guard's culture, its perceived law enforcement role, and its law enforcement expectations significantly contribute to the service's internal environment considerations.

The Coast Guard uses a direct approach to identify its strategic law enforcement issues [Ref. 8:p. 57]. The first strategic issue which emerges from the previously-mentioned four steps is that the Coast Guard first must be sensitive to the present and future needs of the public and mandates from the Administration and Congress. Secondly, the service must strive to maintain its multimission capability and corresponding force structure.

The Coast Guard develops its law enforcement strategy to address the issues highlighted by the previous steps in the strategic planning process. The strategy considers practical alternatives and directs the service toward a vision of success. The vision of success is the Coast Guard's description of what it should look like as it successfully implements its strategies and reaches full potential [Ref. 8:p. 60]. The vision of success description includes the Coast Guard's law enforcement mission, its basic strategies, the Commandant's agenda and long-range view, its performance standards (including PPBS criteria), and decision rules and ethical norms.

C. SECONDARY FINDINGS

While attempting to identify the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy and its development, several secondary research questions arose. This section addresses those subsidiary research questions.

1. What are the Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats, and Strengths Underlying Strategic Management of the USCG Law Enforcement Mission?

The author provided a list of his findings from his "WOTS UP" analysis of the Coast Guard law enforcement mission. These weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and strengths are summarized in Tables 8 through 11. Table 12 summarizes the key points of the WOTS UP analysis.

TABLE 12

USCG ELT MISSION WOTS UP SUMMARY

Strengths

- USCG multimission emphasis and capabilities
- Mission-enthusiastic personnel
- Public/Administration/Congress approval of USCG image

Opportunities

- Use increased funding from counternarcotics emphasis to redevelop infrastructure
- Become more active in the international arena
- Use DoD resources to augment anti-drug efforts

Weaknesses

- No formally stated strategy
- Reactive, short term focus rather than long term, proactive emphasis
- Strategy closely tied to budget

Threats

- Intra- and inter-agency resource competition
- Congress oversight and fiscal process slow strategy development
- Decreased funding as anti-drug sentiment weakens

It is important to note that the WOTS UP analysis is a method that assists the strategist to identify strategic issues. It does so by focusing on the factors involved in the organization's internal and external environments.

The WOTS characteristics noted in this study were compiled from personal and telephone interviews of key Coast Guard personnel at various levels and positions within the organization. As a result, the perceptions of different managers at different levels yield analyses that are subject to debate and disagreement.

2. How is the Illegal Drug Enforcement Strategy Affected by Increased National Interest in:
 - a. Halting the Flow of Narcotics into the U.S.
 - b. Diverting Resources from Supply Reduction Toward Reducing Demand?

The Coast Guard law enforcement strategy seeks to fulfill the designs of the National Drug Control Strategy. One component of the national strategy is a supply reduction policy that the Coast Guard actively supports. Supply reduction, particularly interdiction and apprehension, is the central focus of the policies, objectives, and action sequences in the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy.

The Department of State frequently tasks the Coast Guard with providing personnel and training to foreign government agencies in the narcotics producing nations. The service possesses several characteristics which make it the "service of choice" to conduct such a mission. Among these features are the Coast Guard's non-DoD status, and its tested

professionalism in both counternarcotics and riverine operations.

Thus, the Coast Guard and national strategies include the traditional supply reduction policies and actions of detection, monitoring, interdiction, and apprehension. These programs are now augmented with efforts by the producing nations to control the supply from within their borders. The new focus on international operations aims toward reducing the output of the producing nations and, therefore, should make a significant contribution toward the national supply reduction policy.

The strategic issues that arise from these questions can be identified by focusing on a "WOTS UP" analysis of the law enforcement mission. The illegal drug enforcement strategy must be flexible enough to account for augmenting tactics that halt the narcotics flow into the U.S. with a more proactive eradication program.

This illegal drug enforcement strategy must also consider the forces and focus of the drug control program. Currently, the national strategy emphasizes both supply and demand reduction policies. There is no universally-accepted measure of the effectiveness of either the supply or demand reduction programs, thus national resources will continue to be devoted to both efforts. In the long-range strategic plan, the strategy will maintain its emphasis on both supply and demand policies. The drug enforcement strategy must be

capable of shifting its focus and resources toward that policy which is more effective.

3. How is USCG Strategic Management in the Law Enforcement Mission Affected by Increased Department of Defense Involvement in Narcotics Interdiction?

Increasing the Department of Defense involvement in narcotics interdiction will affect the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy in several ways. These factors are highlighted in the USCG ELT mission WOTS UP summary (Tables 8 through 11). The increased DoD involvement adds more variables to the issues which must be addressed by the Coast Guard's strategy. The issues regarding expanded DoD counternarcotics involvement are present in both the Coast Guard's internal environment (law enforcement expectations, the service's perceived role in law enforcement) and its external environment (public opinion and DoD law enforcement expectations).

4. What Effect does Increased Department of Defense Involvement in Narcotics Interdiction Have on USCG Tactics, Resources, and Force Structure?

The expanded DoD narcotics interdiction involvement will significantly affect Coast Guard law enforcement goals, policies and actions sequences in several manners. First, Coast Guard tactics will shift to include using more DoD resources for the detection and monitoring phases of interdiction, while utilizing its own resources more during the interdiction and apprehension phases.

Second, the number of DoD resources ready and able to augment the Coast Guard's counternarcotics forces eases the demand placed upon the smaller service's resources. These resources include funding, personnel, equipment, and supplies. Third, the DoD and the Coast Guard can combine their joint training requirements with their counternarcotics efforts to incorporate multiple missions into single operations. Thus, the counternarcotics force structure will include both Coast Guard and DoD assets. The Coast Guard's force structure will continue to reflect a multimission capability which enables the service to shift its emphasis to respond to public demand and the mandates of the Administration and Congress.

5. How does the USCG Budget Structure Reflect its Law Enforcement Strategy?

As seen in Table 6, Coast Guard operating expenses since 1984 reflect a renewed emphasis toward the service's law enforcement mission. The budget reflects the need to update an aging force structure with quality resources. The question remains whether the state of the art equipment now dedicated to the high technology counternarcotics effort is needed or efficient should the service shift its future emphasis to other missions. The Coast Guard's budget further exhibits the service's commitment toward its ELT mission in response to public opinion and in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

6. How does the Federal Budget Process (Deficit Reduction, Congressional Oversight, etc.) Influence USCG Law Enforcement Strategy?

As noted earlier, an organization's budget reflects its strategy. In the WOTS UP analysis of the Coast Guard's law enforcement mission, pecuniary considerations are present in each of the four WOTS summaries. The federal budget profoundly affects the Coast Guard's law enforcement strategy --some even say that the service's strategy reflects its budget, not vice versa.

The emphasis on deficit reduction will create increased pressure for all federal agencies to establish that their budget requests address national priorities. Increased demands for funding placed upon decreased finances highlight the intra- and inter-agency competition for budget dollars that will result.

Congressional oversight tends to limit the managerial freedom to form strategies. Pork barrel politics replaces WOTS UP analysis in identifying strategic issues. Legislative oversight also slows the budgetary process and prevents agencies from being able to quickly respond to changing opportunities and threats.

D. RECOMMENDATION

The most significant fact about the Coast Guard's long-range law enforcement strategy is that it is not formally stated. The author has used this study to analyze the

service's law enforcement strategy from different perspectives to personally determine whether such a strategy statement is necessary.

In concluding, the author recommends that the Coast Guard formally develops and issues a long-range strategy statement. Such a document would serve to ensure that each of the stakeholders involved in the Coast Guard law enforcement mission is aware of the strategic issues and the goals, policies, and action sequences that address those issues. Thus, the pattern of decisions that joins Coast Guard law enforcement objectives, policies, and action sequences will be based on a document that provides a consistent and justifiable basis for decision making.

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